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Abstract 
Inconsistence in the use of trade policy reform has characterized Nigeria’s rice imports over the years and little is 
known about the welfare implications of these reforms on the Nigerian households. This study uses a static 
computable general equilibrium model to assess the effect of rice trade policies of an import ban, 80% tariff increase, 
5% tariff reduction and 0% rice import tariff on the welfare of households in the country. Simulation results show 
that no rice trade policy improved social welfare, although producing households’ incomes increased under 
protectionist policies of ban and tariff increase. All households lost welfare with 0% tariff while only the major 
producing and consuming households lost welfare with the 5% reduction in tariffs. The least loss to social welfare 
also occurred in this scenario, hence this policy was recommended for adoption in order to minimize welfare losses 
to households. 
Keywords: Rice; trade policy; tariff; households; welfare; computable general equilibrium  
                 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Nigeria’s Rice Problem  
Nigeria is the largest consumer of rice in Sub-Saharan Africa and the largest rice producer in the West African region 
with a relatively higher comparative advantage than other countries of the region (Nwanze et al, 2006 and FAO, 
2007). However, domestic supply of rice has continued to fall short of demand and importation is undertaken to 
make up the shortfall. The country is currently the second largest importer of rice in the world. However, use of trade 
policy instruments for Nigeria’s rice imports has been largely inconsistent over the years. Since 1970, the 
government has used protectionist policies such as import quotas, outright ban and tariffs as high as 120%. 
Liberalized policies of reduced tariffs, as low as 10%, have also been used including a six-month period of tariff 
elimination in 2008.  Inconsistencies in trade policies have been identified severally in the literature as a disincentive 
to domestic rice production, rice farmers’ welfare and the reason for the country’s failure to attain self sufficiency in 
rice production (Akande, 2002, Daramola, 2005, Ezedinma, 2005, UNEP 2005 and Nwaeze et al, 2006).  This is 
because decision-making and planning become highly uncertain and investments are put at great risk thus, leading to 
income losses for producers which worsen their welfare status and plunge them deeper into poverty. On the other 
hand, consumers’ incomes are also affected as they pay as much as four times the world price for imported rice under 
high tariff regimes thus, worsening their welfare status also (Griswold, 2006).  About 54.4% of Nigerians are poor 
and one in three of every poor Nigerian is a farmer residing in the rural area (NBS, 2005). A lack of welfare and 
well-being is linked to poverty (World Bank, 2001) and as a tool for achieving economic development, public policy 
must bring about improvement of social welfare which would ultimately reduce poverty.  Slesnick (1998) posited 
that a full consideration of a public policy must address the question of how these policies affect the welfare of 
individuals in that country. However, Aigbokhan (2008) identified the government’s policy stance was one of the 
factors which affected the poverty level in the country over the years. From these findings, important questions arise 
such as: how do the different rice trade policy measures of the country affect the welfare of producing and 
consuming households and which rice trade policy best improves the social welfare of Nigerian households?  
 
Several studies have analyzed the impact of trade policies, especially trade liberalization, on Nigeria’s economy. 
Okunmadewa (1999) and Ogundele (2001) used partial equilibrium models to analyze the effects of trade 
liberalization on the economy. These studies found negative implications for the economy but could not incorporate 
households into their models. Olofin et al (2001) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with one 
household to assess the impact of a 50% tariff reduction on all imports. They found that the policy had a positive 
effect on consumption but was negative for production. The use of only one household does not give a clear picture 
of which household group is more affected by the policy. Nwafor et al (2007) used a CGE model with two 
households (rural and urban) to assess the impact of various tariff regime of 0% to 20% levied across all imports. 
They found that rural household incomes were negatively affected by the liberalization policy while urban household 
incomes were positively affected. However, their study did not focus on rice. Obih et al (2008) analyzed the effect of 
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protectionist rice trade policies of a ban and tariff on social welfare using a partial equilibrium model. The study 
found that social welfare improved under the tariff regimes than under the ban. The effects of the protectionist 
policies on household groups (for instance, producing and consuming households) were not found neither did their 
study assess liberalized rice trade policies. Hence, the winners and losers of the either class of policy and their effects 
on social welfare are not known. This therefore highlights the importance to evaluate the rice trade policy options of 
the country in view of their welfare effects. 
 
This paper aims to analyze the effects of the rice trade policy options of ban increase in tariff and liberalization by 
small reduction in tariff and a zero percent tariff charge on the welfare of households in Nigeria. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical underpinning upon which this study is based, section 
3, describes methodology used for the analysis, section four presents the result while section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
1.2. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical underpinning of a trade policy’s welfare effect is found in the utility theory and is analyzed within the 
normative framework provided by the utility theory. The welfare of households in a country is measured as their 
level of utility which is obtained by maximizing their utility function for a given income and price system. Figure 1 
(in the appendix a)  illustrates a small open economy and the effect of an introduction of a trade policy on it. Firstly 
comsider that the country operates a closed economy, such as a ban on imports and exports, consumption is 
constrained by a country’s production possibilities. In figure 1 below, DD represents the Production Transformation 
Curve, and A represents equilibrium; the point where marginal rate of transformation, marginal rate of substitution 
and price ratio are equal. Here, a country maximizes welfare subject to a fixed distribution which is derived by 
producing and consuming X1 and X2 at equilibrium point A.  In the case of a small open, we assume that the country 
has no power to affect world prices of traded goods and that labor markets function well, that is, nominal and real 
wages are flexible. There are two traded sectors X1 and X2 and production in the free trade economy occurs at A 
while consumption occurs at C1. Also, N represents the world price ratio, PW1/PW2 (where PW1= world price of X1 
and PW2= world price of X2). The world price ratio equals the domestic price ratio 
1 2
/X XP P (where 1XP  = domestic 
price of X1 and 
2X
P  = domestic price of X2). Thus, the country can either sell or purchase goods at the world relative 
prices rather than domestic prices as in closed economy in Figure 1. World price of the commodities X1 and X2 are 
exogenously determined and the exchange rate is the link between world price and domestic price. If relative price 
1 2
/X XP P  increases, consumers shift demand for X2 from home to foreign produced goods. The difference between 
consumption of X2 and domestic output equals import of X2. Domestic resources then shift to production of more of 
X1 and the excess production can be exported. If the government introduces a trade policy such as the imposition of a 
tariff on the imports of sector X2, this lowers the relative domestic price below the world price as shown by the lines 
p. This raises the price of both the imported commodity and the import-competing commodity and results in a price 
increase which creates an incentive for domestic production of the importable. Thus the tariff imposition results in: 
1. A production effect- producers shift towards the production of the importable; from A to B. 
2. Government-revenue effect- government revenue increases due to tariff collection; from G to H.  
3. The volume of trade reduces; as indicated by the relative size of the two trade triangles. 
4. The welfare effect- society loses welfare as it moves to a lower indifference curve C3. This social welfare 
loss occurs due to: 
a. The cost of producing inefficiently; from C1 to C4. 
b. The cost of consumption at distorted prices; from C4 to C3 
 
 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Structure of the model 
The model used for the study is a static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which follows Dervis, de 
Melo and Robinson (1982). The forms of the model are given in the appendix (c). The functions used are constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) of both the Cobb- Douglas  and the Leontief types. The production function combines 
two primary inputs of labour (LAB) and capital (CAP) to produce output in each sector i with value added (XVi).  
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                   www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol 4, No.8, 2012 
 
162 
  
( )1
.i i iXV avLAB CAP
αα −=                                                          (1) 
 
Households earn their income from labour and capital employed in production and total household income (HHYh) 
received by the households is the sum the income received by each household which is a function of labour supplied 
at the ruling wage rate (W) and capital stock of the households at the ruling price of capital (PK). 
 
( ) ( ). 1h hi i hi i i iHHY hfyls LAB W hfyks CAPPK depr= + −∑ ∑       (2) 
 
Where hihfyls the share of factor income from labour is received by household i and hihfyks  is the share of factor 
income from capital received by household i and idepr  is the depreciation rate in sector i. 
 
 
Households spend their income on goods produced by the sectors including their import competing commodities. 
However, imports and domestic demand were assumed to be imperfect substitutes in line with the Armington 
assumption (Armington, 1969).  Hence, the quantity of composite commodity i consumed by household h 
(
( , )h iHEXPQ ) is given by 
 
( , )
exp .hi h
h i
i
h s HHY
HEXPQ
P
=                                                              (3) 
 
Where exp hih s the expenditure is share for household h on goods from sector i and iP  is the price of composite 
commodity in sector i. Each household maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to their income thus the 
household utility ( hHHU ) is given by 
 
exp logh hi hiHHU h s HEXPQ=∑  
 
Household savings ( hSAV ) are specified as the difference between household income and its expenditure while total 
household savings of all the households ( HSAV ) is obtained from the sum of the savings of each household put 
together. 
 
.exph h i hSAV HHY h s HHY= −∑                                                   (4) 
hHSAV SAV=∑                                                                            (5) 
 
 
2.2 Data 
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) was constructed from the 2004 input-output (I-O) table for Nigeria which was 
the most recent I-O available at the time the study was conducted. The production activities /sectors in the SAM are: 
Rice, Other agriculture, Oil and mining and Manufacturing and services. Factor inputs employed in production are 
labour and capital, which encompasses all factors other than labour. The SAM has four households namely: rural 
north, rural south, urban north and urban south. The first two households are net producers of rice while the latter 
two are net consumers of rice. Shares of household income and expenditure were obtained from the Nigerian Living 
Standard Survey for 2004. The base year data on the households are presented on Table 1 in the appendix (b). 
Elasticity values for import and export functions were obtained from CBN (2005) while production elasticity values 
for rice were obtained from NBS (2007). 
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2.3. Simulation experiments in the model 
Four policy scenarios were simulated in this study. These policy scenarios represented the various rice trade policy 
measures that have been used in the since 1970 till date and/or are under consideration by the government. The four 
policy scenarios simulated in this study were grouped under two main types of rice trade policies, namely (i) the 
protectionist policies consisting of: ban and use of high tariffs, and (ii) the liberalization policies consisting of: a 
small reduction in tariff (5%) and zero (0%) percent charge/ total removal of tariff on rice imports. Thus, the four 
simulations carried out were: 
 
A ban on importation of rice 
The ban on importation of rice was used by the government from 1978 to 1979 and also from 1985 to 1995. This is 
considered an extreme protectionist policy in the study. In 2007 and 2011 the government had considered placing a 
ban on rice imports. This was due to several calls from pressure groups such as the Rice Farmers Association on 
Nigeria (RIFAN), in addition to government’s concern about the country’s rising food import bill. 
 
Increase in tariff rate 
Tariff increases have characterized Nigeria’s rice trade policy reforms especially since after the ban was lifted in 
1995. The highest tariff charged on rice imports was 120% which occurred in the base year. However, the study 
chose to simulate the highest increase in tariff from one policy year to another. This was an increase of 80% when 
tariffs were increased from 19% in 1978 to 100% in 1995 (in between these periods the quota system and bans were 
in effect).  
 
A small reduction of 5% in tariff rate 
Reduction of tariffs on rice imports occurred severally since 1970 till date. Tariff cuts have ranged from as small as 
1% and 5% to as large as large as 69%. However, the study considered a small reduction in tariff of 5% for three 
reasons. Firstly, simulating 1% reduction may not show any appreciable change in the base solution which can 
inform policy. Secondly, a 5% and 10% change in import tax have been found to not so different from one another 
(see Olopoenia and Aminu, 2007). Thirdly, 5% is an approximate mean value of the two lowest reductions in rice 
import tariffs that have been used in Nigeria. 
 
Zero percentage tariff rate 
The fourth policy scenario of a no-tariff charge on rice imports was used in 2008 in the wake of the global grain 
crisis. This policy option represents a free trade scenario where no tariff is charged on rice imports. This is the policy 
option that the WTO would have all countries of the world re-engineer their trade policy towards in other to ensure 
free trade globally. 
 
Evaluation of welfare implications of rice trade policy on households were estimated by calculating welfare 
gains/losses from simulation results with Hicksian Equivalent Variations (EV) following Olopoenia and Aminu 
(2007), Annabi et al (2006) and Devarajan et al (2001). The Hicksian EV was given by 
 
h h
h hn o
oh
o
U U
EV Y
U
 −
=  
 
                                                                               (6) 
 
Where 
h
oY  is the income of household h before the policy change, 
h
oU  is the utility of household h before the policy 
change, 
h
nU  is the utility of household h after the policy change and 
hEV   is the Equivalent Variation of a 
household h. 
 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Figures 2 to 5 in appendix (a) present the direction and magnitude of change in the household variables in response 
to the policy changes while Table 2 in appendix (b) presents the welfare gains/losses to each household arising from 
the policy scenarios simulated in the CGE model. Figure 2 shows that the rural households were better off while the 
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urban households were worse off under the protectionist policy of a ban. The rural north households’ income, 
savings and marginal utility increased most (0.3%, 0.3% and 0.03% respectively) while that of the urban south 
households fell fastest (2.5%, 2.5% and 0.18% respectively). The EV results on Table 2 reveal further that the 
welfare gain for the rural north was the largest (₦2.33 billion) while the urban south had the biggest loss in welfare 
(₦65.93 billion). This may be due to the fact that the majority of rice farmers in Nigeria (83% according to NBS, 
2007) are located in the rural north, hence as net producers they reaped the greatest benefit of the price effect of a 
rice import ban. Conversely, urban south households are net consumers of rice and they consume more imported rice 
than urban north households. Hence, the increase in price occasioned by the import ban caused the income of the 
urban households to fall. Poverty profile figures by NBS (2005) have shown that rural households in Nigeria are 
poorer than the urban households and that the rural north households were poorer than the rural south households. 
Hence, the protectionist policy of an import ban on rice is likely to improve the welfare and ultimately contribute to 
poverty reduction in these households. Overall, however, the country loses welfare up to ₦92.79 billion with the ban. 
This includes what the households lose as a result of reduced spending of government since there may be a loss of 
revenue which would have accrued to the government from tariffs charges.  Hence, the economy ultimately loses 
with a rice import ban policy. 
 
The results for an increase in tariff rate (about 80%) on Figure 3 show a similar pattern as observed on Figure 2. This 
indicates that the protectionist policies cause effects in the same direction but with varying magnitude depending on 
the extent of protection employed (ban is a more extreme protectionist policy than increasing tariffs). The rural 
households were better off with 80% tariff increase, while the urban households were worse off. Figure 3 shows that 
again, the rural north households’ income, savings and marginal utility increased most by 0.1%, 0.1% and 0.01% 
respectively while that of the urban south households fell fastest by thrice as much. The EV results on Table 2 show 
that rural north households were the biggest winners under the tariff increase with a welfare gain of ₦0.46 billion. 
The urban south households lost the most welfare of ₦14.65 billion. This further goes to buttress the fact that the 
protective policy of tariff regime on rice imports is a favorable policy option for the rural households but negatively 
affects urban households. However, the reduction in the magnitude of welfare gain/loss, relative to the ban scenario, 
may be due to the fact that these net producers were not entirely shielded from competition while consumers could 
increase their rice consumption due to the availability of imported rice, although at higher prices. 
 
The result of a liberalized scenario which involves a small reduction of 5% in tariff on Figure 4 shows that only the 
urban north households were better off while the rural north and the urban south households were worse off. The 
rural south households were unaffected by the trade policy. The urban north households’ income and savings each 
increased by 0.11% and marginal utility did not change while that of the urban south households decreased by twice 
as much. The EV from Table 2 showed that welfare of rural south and urban north households did not change while 
welfare loss to the rural north was ₦0.69 billion and that of the urban south households was ₦7.33 billion. This was 
the least loss by the urban south households recorded across all simulations. This shows that a minimal reduction in 
tariff, while not changing the welfare of the rural households, causes less welfare loss to urban households than the 
protectionist policies. Also, the welfare loss to all households’ (about ₦8.03 billion) represented the least loss to the 
country. This is consistent with the findings of Olopoenia and Aminu (2007). This shows that a small reduction in 
tariff will hurt national welfare least. Figure 5 shows that under the liberalized trade policy scenario of a zero tariff 
on rice imports, all households were worse off especially the rural households. The income, savings and marginal 
utility of the rural north households fell fastest by 17.9%, 17.9% and 1.42 respectively while that of the urban south 
only fell by about a third of this. The urban south households suffered the least loss of income because imported rice, 
which is consumed mostly by these households, was readily available and at reduced prices.  However, the welfare 
loss to the rural north (₦115.02 billion) indicated on Table 2 was the least with this policy while that of the urban 
north households (₦261.49 billion) was the largest. These welfare losses may have arisen as a result of increases in 
prices of other goods and its attendant costs. Overall, national welfare decreased by ₦694.06 billion; the largest 
welfare loss across all scenarios. This may have been due to loss in government revenue arising from the effect of the 
full liberalization policy. Thus, a policy of complete removal of tariffs on rice imports will result in the greatest 
national welfare loss for Nigeria.  The result is consistent with Wailes (2004) who found that trade liberalization 
would hurt Nigeria’s welfare. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The study has found that rural households’ welfare increase with extremity of policy protection (as with a ban), 
although at the expense of social welfare.  On the other hand, an extreme liberalization policy of a zero percentage 
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tariff on rice imports hurts all households’ welfare and national welfare most. However, the least loss in national 
welfare occurred with a small reduction in rice import tariff. A lesser number of households were also hurt with this 
policy. Thus, the major policy implication of the study’s findings is that the small reduction in tariff should be 
adopted as Nigeria’s rice trade policy for rice importation as this option is least welfare-reducing for the national 
welfare. In line with this, welfare improving policies targeted at the disadvantaged households, especially the rural 
north households, would also be needful to cancel out welfare losses.  
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APENDIX a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               D 
Figure 1: Trade policy effect. 
The Figure shows the effect of a trade policy on production, consumption and trade. 
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Figure 2: Effect of a ban on rice imports on the Nigerian households 
The Figure shows the percentage changes in household income, savings and utility in response to a rice import ban 
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Effect of an 80% increase in Rice Import Tariff on 
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Figure 3: Effect of an 80% increase in rice import tariffs on the Nigerian households 
The Figure shows the percentage changes in household income, savings and utility in response to 80% increase in 
rice import tariff 
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Figure 4: Effect of a 5% reduction in rice import tariffs on the Nigerian households 
The Figure shows the percentage changes in household income, savings and utility in response to 5% decrease in rice 
import tariff 
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Figure 5: Effect of a 0% tariff on rice import on the Nigerian households 
The Figure shows the percentage changes in household income, savings and utility in response to an elimination of 
rice import tariff 
Where: 
RN – Rural north 
RS – Rural south 
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UN – Urban north 
US – Urban south 
HHINC  – Household income 
HHSAV – Household savings 
HHUTL – Household utility 
 
APENDIX b 
Table 1: Base year values of households used in the model (₦billion) 
 Households 
Variables Rural north 
 
Rural south   Urban north  Urban south  Total  
Household 
income 
8 126 
(9.9) 
10 924 
(13.3) 
27 310 
(33.3) 
35 772 
(43.5) 
82 134 
(100) 
Household 
savings 
-12 070 
(-79.4) 
-10 059 
(-66.2) 
14 509 
(95.4) 
22 825 
(150.1) 
15 205 
(100) 
Household 
utility 
34.8 
(47.6) 
27.0 
(36.9) 
6.4 
(8.8) 
4.9 
(6.7) 
73.1 
(100) 
Source: Computation from CGE model solution 
Figures in parentheses are percentages 
 
 
Table 2: Welfare effect of the rice trade policies on Nigerian households (₦billion) 
 
 
 
 
Households 
EV from a ban 
on rice imports  
EV from an 80% 
increase in rice 
import tariff   
EV from a 5% 
reduction in Rice 
Import Tariff  
EV from a 0% 
Tariff on Rice 
Import  
 
Rural north 
2.33 0.46 -0.69 -115.02 
 
Rural south 
0.81 0.41 0.00 -149.05 
 
Urban north 
-30.00 -8.57 0.00 -261.49 
 
Urban south 
-65.93 -14.65 -7.33 -168.49 
 
Social welfare 
-92.79 -22.35 -8.02 -694.06 
Source: Computations from Hicksian measures. 
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APENDIX c 
The CGE model for the study 
( )1 ( ) ( . ) .i i i i ji j i iPV PX td sub IO P PN nx= − − − −∑              7 
 ( ). 1im im imPM ER PWM tm= +                                                  8 
( ). 1in imn inPN ER PWN tn= +                                                     9 
( ). 1ie ie iePE ER PWE te= +                                                        10 
. . . ii i i i i
i
M
P PD D PM M
Q
= +                                                       
11 
. . .i i i i i iPX X PD D PE E= +                                                        12 
.i iPINDEX pwts P=∑                                                             13 
( )1 ii i i
i
X
CAP PV
PK
α= −                                                           
14 
. ii i i
X
LAB PV
W
α=                                                                     
15 
i iCAPY CAPPK=∑                                                                 16 
.iLABY LAB W=∑                                                                  17 
. . .im im in n inIMTAX tm PWM ER tn PWN N= +∑ ∑            18 
i i iINDTAX td PX X=∑                                                                                         19 
GRT IMTAX INDTAX GOVSUB= + −                             20 
GET GRT=                                                                                 21 
( )sec. 1iSECGOV g GRT govsavr= −                                  22 
i hiCD HEXPQ=∑                                                                   23 
.GOVSAV govsavr GET=                                                       24 
INVEST SAVINGS=                                                                25 
Market clearing conditions  
i i i i iQ INTD CD SECGOV ID= + + +                                  26 
 
 
 
Where 
( )iPV , ( )iPX , ( )iPD , ( )iPE , ( )iPM  and ( )iPN  are price of value-added by sector, price of goods 
produced by sector, price of goods sold locally by sector, domestic price of export by sector, domestic price of 
import by sector and domestic price of intermediate import by sector respectively. PINDEX  is the price index 
while 
( )ipwts  is the consumer price index weights by sector. Also, ( )itm , ( )itn , ( )itd , ( )ite ,  ( )inx and ( )isub  are 
import duty rate on final good by sector, import duty rate on intermediate good by sector, excise duty rate on 
domestic good by sector, export duty rate by sector, ratio of imported intermediate to output by sector and sector’s 
subsidy rate.  iQ  is the composite final good by sector while ( )iX , ( )iD , ( )iE , ( )iM  and ( )iN  are domestic output 
by sector, domestic supply of good produced locally by sector, export of goods produced locally by sector, import of 
final good by sector and imported intermediate good by sector. LABY  is total labour income, CAPY  is gross 
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capital income, 
( )iCD  is households private consumption on sector I, IMTAX  is import duty, INDTAX  is the 
indirect tax, INVEST  is investment 
 
 
( )iINTD  is sectoral  intermediate input supply and ( )iSECGOV  is sectoral expenditure of government. 
Finally,GR T , GE T, NGE , and GOVSAV are government revenue, government expenditure, net government 
expenditure and government savings while govsavr  is the government savings rate. 
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